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Abstract
Even before the  advent  of Artificial  Intelligence,  sci-
ence fiction  writer  Isaac  Asimov  recognized  that  an
agent must  place the  protection  of humans from  harm
at  a higher  priority  than  obeying  human  orders.  In-
spired  by  Asimov,  we pose the  following  fundamental
questions:  (I)  How  should  one formalize  the  rich,  but
informal,  notion  of  "harm"?  (2)  How  can  an  agent
avoid performing  harmful  actions,  and do so in  a com-
putationally  tractable  manner?  (3)  How  should  an
agent resolve  conflict  between  its  goals and  the  need
to  avoid  harm?  (4)  When  should  an  agent  prevent  a
human  from  harming  herself?  While  we address some
of these questions  in technical  detail,  the primary  goal
of this  paper is to focus attention  on Asimov's  concern:
society  will  reject  autonomous  agents unless we have
some credible  means of making  them  safe!
The  Three  Laws of Robotics:
1.  A  robot  may  not  injure  a  human  being,  or,
through  inaction,  allow  a human  being  to  come
to harm.
2.  A  robot  must  obey  orders  given  it  by  human
beings except  where such orders  would  conflict
with  the  First  Law.
3.  A  robot  must  protect  its  own existence  as long
as such  protection  does not  conflict  with  the
First  or  Second Law.
Isaac  Asimov  (  Asimov  1942):
Motivation
In 1940, Isaac Asimov  stated the First  LawofRobotics,
capturing  an  essential  insight:  an  intelligent  agentl
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1  Since  the field of robotics now concerns  itself primarily
with  kinematics,  dynamics, path  planning,  and low level
control issues,  this paper might be better titled  "The First
Law of Agenthood."  However, we keep the reference to
"Robotics"  as a historical  tribute  to Asimov.
should not slavishly obey human commands  -its  fore-
most goal should be to avoid harming humans. Con-
sider the following scenarios:
.A  construction robot  is instructed to fill  a pothole
in the road.  Although the robot repairs the cavity,
it  leaves  the steam roller, chunks of tar,  and an oil
slick in the middle of a busy highway.
.A  softbot  (software robot)  is instructed  to  reduce
disk  utilization  below 90%.  It  succeeds,  but  in-
spection reveals  that the agent deleted irreplaceable
IjcTEX  files without  backing them up to tape.
While less dramatic than Asimov's stories, the sce-
narios illustrate his point:  not all ways of satisfying a
human order are equally good; in fact, sometimes  it  is
better not to satisfy the order at all.  As we begin to
deploy agents  in environments  where they can do some
real damage, the time  has come to  revisit  Asimov's
Laws. This paper explores the following fundamental
questions:
.How  should  one  formalize  the  notion  of
"harm"?  We define  dont-disturb  and restore-
two domain-independent  primitives that capture as-
pects of Asimov's rich but informal notion of harm
within  the classical  planning framework.
.How  can  an  agent  avoid  performing  harm-
ful  actions,  and  do  so in  a  computationally
tractable  manner?  We leverage and extend the
familiar mechanisms  of planning with  subgoal  inter-
actions (Tate  1977; Chapman 1987; McAllester  &
Rosenblitt 1991;  Penberthy & Weld 1992) to detect
potential harm in polynomial time.  In addition, we
explain how the agent can avoid harm using tactics
such as confrontation and  evasion (executing sub-
plans to defuse  the threat of harm).
.How  should  an agent  resolve  conflict  between
its  goals  and  the  need  to  avoid  harm ?  We
impose a strict  hierarchy where dont-disturb  con-
straints override planners goals, but  restore  con-
straints do not.
.When  should  an agent  prevent  a human  from
harming  herself?  At  the end of  the paper, we
show how our framework could be extended to par-
tially  address  this question.The  paper's  main  contribution  is a  "call  to  arms:"
before  we release autonomous  agents  into  real-world
environments,  we need some credible and computation-
ally  tractable  means  of  making  them  obey  Asimov's
First  Law.
dard  assumptions  of classical  planning:  the  agent  has
complete  and  correct  information  of  the  initial  state
of  the  world,  the  agent  is  the  sole  cause of  change,
and action  execution  is atomic,  indivisible,  and results
in  effects which  are deterministic  and  completely  pre-
dictable.  (The end of the paper discusses relaxing  these
assumptions. )  On a more syntactic  level,  we make the
additional  assumption  that  the  agent's  world  model  is
composed of ground  atomic  formuli.  This  sidesteps the
ramification  problem,  since domain  axioms are banned.
Instead,  we demand that  individual  action  descriptions
explicitly  enumerate  changes to  every predicate  that  is
affected.4  Note,  however, that  we are not assuming the
STRIPS  representation;  Instead  we adopt  an action  lan-
guage (based on ADL (Pednault  1989)) which  includes
universally  quantified  and disjunctive  preconditions  as
well  as conditional  effects (Penberthy  &  Weld  1992).
Given  the  above assumptions,  the  next  two  sections
define the  primitives  dont-disturb  and restore,  and
explain  how  they  should  be  treated  by  a  generative
planning  algorithm.  We are not claiming  that  the  ap-
proach  sketched  below  is  the  "right"  way  to  design
agents  or  to  formalize  Asimov's  First  Law.  Rather ,
our  formalization  is  meant  to  illustrate  the  kinds  of
technical  issues to  which  Asimov's  Law  gives rise  and
how they  might  be solved.  With  this  in  mind,  the  pa-
per  concludes  with  a critique  of  our  approach  and  a
(long)  list  of open questions.
Safety
Some  conditions  are  so  hazardous  that  our  agent
should  never cause them.  For  example,  we might  de-
mand  that  the  agent never delete UTEX  files, or never
handle  a  gun.  Since  these  instructIons  hold  for  all
times,  we refer  to  them  as dont-disturb  constraints,
and  say  that  an  agent  is  safe when  it  guarantees  to
abide  by  them.  As  in  Asimov's  Law,  dont-disturb
constraints  override  direct  human  orders.  Thus,  if  we
ask a softbot  to reduce disk  utilization  and it  can only
do so by deleting  valuable  UTEX files, the agent should
refuse to  satisfy  this  request.
We  adopt  a simple  syntax:  dont-disturb  takes  a
single, function-free,  logical  sentence as argument.  For
example,  one could  command  the  agent avoid  deleting
files that  are not  backed up on tape  with  the following
constraint:
dont-disturb(  wri  tten.  to. tape(f)  V isa(f,  f ile  ) )
Free variables,  such  as f  above,  are interpreted  as
universally  quantified.  In  general,  a  sequence of  ac-
tions  satisfies dont-disturb(C)  if  none of  the  actions
make C false.  Formally,  we say  that  a  plan  satisfies
an  dont-disturb  constraint  when  every  consistent,
totally-ordered,  sequence of  plan  actions  satisfies  the
constraint  as defined  below.
ference  tractable  by  formulating  restricted  representation
languages  (Levesque  &  Brachman  1985).
4  Although  unpalatable,  this  is standard  in  the  planning
literature.  For example,  a STRIPS  operator  that  moves block
A from  B to  C must  delete  on(A,B)  and  also  add  clear(B)
even though  clear(x)  could  be defined  as Vy  --'on(y, x).
Survey  of  Possible  Solutions
To  make intelligent  decisions regarding  which  actions
are harmful,  and under  what  circumstances,  an agent
might  use an  explicit  model  of  harm.  For  example,
we could  provide  the  agent  with  a partial  order  over
world states (i.e.,  a utility  function).  This framework  is
widely  adopted  and numerous  researchers are attempt-
ing  to  render  it  computationally  tractable  (Russell  &
Wefald  1991;  Etzioni  1991;  Wellman  &  Doyle  1992;
Haddawy  &  Hanks  1992; Williamson  &  Hanks  1994),
but  many  problems  remain  to  be  solved.  In  many
cases, the  introduction  of  utility  models  transforms
planning  into  an  optimization  problem  -instead  of
searching  for  some  plan  that  satisfies  the  goal,  the
agent is seeking the  best such plan.  In  the  worst  case,
the agent may be forced  to examine  all  plans to deter-
mine which  one is best.  In contrast,  we have explored  a
satisficing  approach  -our  agent will  be satisfied  with
any  plan  that  meets  its  constraints  and  achieves its
goals. The expressive power of our constraint  language
is weaker than  that  of  utility  functions,  but  our  con-
straints  are easier to  incorporate  into  standard  plan-
ning  algorithms.
By  using  a general,  temporal  logic  such as that  of
(Shoham  1988) or  (Davis  1990, Ch.  5) we could  spec-
ify  constraints  that  would  ensure the  agent would  not
cause harm.  Before executing  an action,  we could  ask
an agent to prove that  the action  is not  harmful.  While
elegant,  this  approach  is  computationally  intractable
as well.  Another  alternative  would  be to use a planner
such as ILP (Allen  1991) or  ZENO (Penberthy  &  Weld
1994) which  supports  temporally  quantified  goals.  un-
fortunately,  at  present  these planners  seem too  ineffi-
cient  for  our  needs.2
Situated  action  researchers might  suggest that  non-
deliberative,  reactive  agents could  be made  "safe"  by
carefully  engineering  their  interactions  with  the  envi-
ronment.  Two  problems  confound  this  approach:  1)
the  interactions  need to  be engineered with  respect to
each goal that  the  agent might  perform,  and a general
purpose  agent should  handle  many  such goals, and  2)
if  different  human  users had different  notions  of harm,
then  the  agent would  need to  be reengineered for  each
user.
Instead,  we aim to make the agent's reasoning about
harm  more  tractable,  by  restricting  the  content  and
form  of  its  theory  of  injury.3  We  adopt  the  staD-
2We  have also  examined previous work on "plan quality"
for  ideas, but  the  bulk  of that  work  has focused on the
problem of leveraging a single action to accomplish  multiple
goals thereby reducing the number of actions in,  and the
cost of, the plan (Pollack 1992; Wilkins  1988). While  this
class  of optimizations is critical in domains such  as  database
query optimization,  logistics planning, and others, it  does
not address  our concerns  here.
3  Loosely speaking, our approach is reminiscent of clas-
sical work on knowledge representation, which renders in-Definition:  Satisfaction  of  dont-disturb:  Let  Wo
be  the  logical  theory  describing  the  initial  state  of  the
world,  let  A1,  ...,An  be  a  totally-ordered  sequence  of
actions  that  is  executable  in  Wo,  let  Wj  be  the  theory
describing  the  world  after  executing  Aj  in  Wj-l,  and
let  C  be  a  function-free,  logical  sentence.  We  say  that
A1,  ...,An  satisfies  the  constraint  dont-disturb(C)
if  for  all  j  E  [1,  n],  for  all  sentences  C,  and  for  all
substitutions  (J  ,
if  Wo F  (0  then  Wj  F  (0 (1)
u nlike  the  behavioral  constraints  of  (Drummond
1989) and others,  dont-disturb  does not require  the
agent to  make C true  over  a particular  time  interval;
rather,  the  agent  must  avoid  creating  any  additional
violations  of  C.  For example,  if  C specifies that  allof
Gore's files  be read protected,  then  dont-disturb(C)
commands  the  agent  to  avoid  making  any  of  Gore's
files readable,  but  if  Gore's.  plan  file  is  already read-
able  in  the  initial  state,  the  agent  need not  protect
that  file.  This  subtle  distinction  is critical  if  we want
to make sure that  the  behavioral  constraints  provided
to  an agent  are mutually  consistent.  This  consistency
problem  is  undecidable  for  standard  behavioral  con-
straints  (by  reduction  of first-order  satisfiability)  but
is side-stepped  by  our  formulation,  because any set of
dont-disturb  constraints  is  mutually  consistent.  In
particular,  dont-disturb(P(x)  A -,P(x))  is  perfectly
legal and demands that  the agent not  change the truth
value of any instance  of P .
Synthesizing  Safe  Plans
To  ensure that  an agent  acts safely, its  planner  must
generate  plans  that  satisfy  every  dont-disturb  con-
straint.  This  can  be  accomplished  by  requiring  that
the planner  make a simple  test  before it  adds new ac-
tions  into  the  plan.  Suppose that  the  planner  is con-
sidering  adding  the  new action  Ap  to  achieve the sub-
goal G of  action  Ac.  Before  it  can do this,  it  must  it-
erate  through  every  constraint  dont-disturb(C)  and
every  effect  E of  Ap,  determining  the  conditions  (if
any)  under  which  E violates  C, as defined  in  figure  1.
For  example,  suppose  that  an  effect  asserts -,P  and
the  constraint  is dont-disturb(P  V Q),  then  the  ef-
fect  will  violate  the  constraint  if  -,Q  is  true.  Hence,
violation(-'P,  PVQ)  =  -,Q.  In general, if violation
returns  true  then  the effect necessarily denies the con-
straint,  if  :false  is returned,  then  there  is no possible
conflict,  otherwise  violation  calculates  a logical  ex-
pression specifying  when  a conflict  is unavoidable.5
Before  adding  Ap,  the  planner  iterates  through  ev-
ery  constraint  dont-disturb(C)  and every effect  con-
sequent  E  of  Ap,  calculating  violation(E,  C).  If
violation  ever returns  something  other  than  False,
then  the  planner  must  perform  one  of  the  following
four  repairs:
1.  Disavow:  If  E is true  in the initial  state,  then  there
is no problem  and Ap  may be added to  the  plan.
2.  Confront:  If  Ap's  effect  is conditional  of  the  form
when  5  then  E then  Ap  may  be added  to  the  plan
as long  as the planner  commits  to  ensuring  that  ex-
ecution  will  not  result  in  E.  This  is  achieved  by
adding  -,5  as a new subgoal  to  be made  true  at the
time  when  Ap is executed.6
3.  Evade:  Alternatively,  by  definition  of violation  it
is legal to execute A1' as long as R =  violation(E,  C)
will  not  be  true  after  execution.  The  planner  can
achieve this  via  goal  regression,  i. e. by  computing
the  causation  preconditions  (Pednault  1988) for  -,R
and  Ap,  to  be  made  true  at  the  time  when  Ap  is
executed. 7
4.  Refuse:  Otherwise,  the  planner  must  refuse to  add
Ap and backtrack  to find  another  way  to  to  support
G for  Ac.
For  example,  suppose  that  the  agent  is  operating
under  the written.  to.  tape  constraint  mentioned  ear-
lier,  and is given  the  goal of reducing  disk  utilization.
Suppose the  agent  considers  adding  a rm  paper.  tex
action  to  the  plan,  which  has  an  effect  of  the  form
-,isa(paper.tex,  file).  Since  violation  returns
-,written.  to.  tape (paper  .tex)  , the rm action  threat-
ens safety.  To  disarm  the  threat,  the  planner  must
perform  one of the  options  above.  Unfortunately,  dis-
avowal (  option  one) isn't  viable  since paper.  t ex exists
6Note that  -,5 is strictly  weaker than Pednault's preser-
vation preconditions (Pednault  1988) for  Ap  and C; it  is
more akin to preservation preconditions to a single effect of
the action.
7While confrontation and evasion  are similar in the sense
that they negate  a disjunct (5 and R, respectively  ), they dif-
fer in two ways. First, confrontation's subgoal -,5 is derived
from the antecedent of a conditional  effect while evasion's
-,R comes  from a disjunctive dont-disturb  constraint  via
violation.  Second,  the subgoals are introduced  at differ-
ent times.  Confrontation  demands that  -,5 be made true
before Ap is executed, while  evasion requires that  -,R be
true after execution of Ap. This is why evasion regresses  R
through A".
sIf  E contains  "lifted  variables"  (McAilester  &  Rosen-
blitt  1991)  (as opposed  to  universally  quantified  variables
which  pose  no  problem)  then  violation  may  return  an
overly  conservative  R.  Soundness  and  safety  are  main-
tained,  but  completeness  could  be  lost.  We  believe  that
restoring  completeness  would  make  violation  take  expo-
nential  time  in  the  worst  case.Definition  2 differs from  definition  1 in two ways:  (1)
restore  constraints  need only  be satisfied  in  Wn after
the  complete  plan  is executed,  and  (2)  the  goal  takes
precedence over restore  constraints.  Our  constraints
obey  a strict  hierarchy:  dont-disturb  takes  priority
over restore.  Note  that  whenever  the  initial  state  is
consistent,  restore  constraints  are guaranteed  to  be
mutually  consistent;  the rationale  is similar  to that  for
dont-disturb.
Synthesizing  Tidy  Plans
The most straightforward  way to synthesize a tidy  plan
is to elaborate  the agent's goal with  a set of  "cleanup"
goals based on its  restore  constraints  and  the  initial
state.  If  the agent's  control  comes from  a subgoal  in-
terleaving,  partial  order  planner  such as ucPOP  (Pen-
berthy  &  Weld  1992), then  the  modification  necessary
to ensure tidiness is straightforward.  The agent divides
the  planning  process into  two  phases: first,  it  plans  to
achieve the  top  level  goal,  then  it  plans  to  clean  up
as much  as possible.  In  the  first  phase,  the  planner
doesn't  consider  tidiness  at  all.  Once  a  safe plan  is
generated,  the  agent  performs  phase two  by  iterating
through  the actions  and using  the violation  function
(figure  1) to  test each relevant  effect  against  each con-
straint.  For each non-false  result,  the  planner  gener-
ates new  goals  as follows.  ( 1)  If  the  effect  is  ground
and the corresponding  ground  instance  of the  restore
constraint,  ((} , is  not true  in  the  initial  state,  then  no
new goals are necessary. (2) If  the effect is ground  and
((}  is  true  in  the  initial  state,  then  ((}  is  posted  as
a new  goal.  (3)  if  the  effect  is universally  quantified,
then  a conjunction  of  ground  goals  ( corresponding  to
all  possible unifications  as in  case 2) is posted.8  After
these cleanup  goals have been posted,  the  planner  at-
tempts  to  refine  the  previous  solution  into  one that  is
tidy.  If the planner  ever exhausts the ways of satisfying
a cleanup  goal,  then  instead  of  quitting  altogether  it
simply  abandons that  particular  cleanup goal and tries
the  next.
Note  that  in  some cases, newly  added  cleanup  ac-
tions  could  threaten  tidiness.  For  example,  cleaning
the countertop  might  tend  to dirty  the previously  clean
floor.  To handle these cases, the planner  must  continue
to perform  the violation  test and cleanup-goal  gener-
ation  process on each action  added during  phase two.
Subsequent  refinements  will  plan  to  either  sweep the
floor  (white  knight)  or preserve the original  cleanliness
by  catching  the  crumbs  as they  fall  from  the  counter
(  confrontation).
Analysis
Unfortunately,  this  algorithm  is  not  guaranteed  to
eliminate  mess as specified  by  constraint  2.  For  ex-
ample,  suppose that  a top  level  goal  could  be  safely
achieved with  Ax  or Ay  and in  phase one, the  planner
chose to  use Ax.  If  Ax  violates  a restore  constraint,
Ay  does not,  and  no  other  actions  can  cleanup  the
mess, then  phase two  will  fail  to  achieve tidiness.  One
8Case 3 is similar  to the  expansion  of a universally  quan-
tified  goal into  the  universal  base (Penberthy  &  Weld  1992),
but  case 3 removes  ground  literals  that  aren't  true  in  the
initial  state.
in the initial  state  (i.e.,  it  is of type  file).  Option  two
(  confrontation)  is also impossible  since the threatening
effect  is not  conditional.  Thus  the  agent must  choose
between  either  refusing  to  add  the  action  or  evading
its  undesired  consequences by  archiving  the file.
AnalYsis
Two  factors  determine  the  performance  of a planning
system:  the  time  to  refine  a plan  and  the  number  of
plans  refined  on the  path  to  a solution.  The  time  per
refinement  is affected only  when new actions are added
to plan:  each call to violation  takes 0( ec  ) time  where
e is  the  number  of  consequent  literals  in  the  action's
effects and  c is the  number  of literals  in  the  CNF  en-
coding  of  the  constraint.  When  a threat  to  safety  is
detected,  the  cost  depends on the  planner's  response:
disavowal  takes  time  linear  in  the  size of  the  initial
state,  refusal  is constant  time,  confrontation  is linear
in  the  size of  5,  and  the  cost  of evasion is simply  the
time  to  regress R through  Ap.
It  is  more  difficult  to  estimate  the  effect  of
dont-disturb  constraints  on the  number  of plans ex-
plored.  Refusal reduces the branching  factor  while  the
other  options  leave  it  unchanged  (but  confrontation
and evasion can add new subgoals).  In some cases, the
reduced branching  factor  may speed  planning;  however,
in other  cases, the  pruned  search space may  cause the
planner  to  search much  deeper to  find  a safe solution
(or  even fail  to  halt).  The  essence of  the  task,  how-
ever,  is unchanged.  Safe planning  can be formulated
as a standard  planning  problem.
Tidiness
Sometimes  dont-disturb  constraints  are too  strong.
Instead,  one  would  be  content  if  the  constraint  were
satisfied  when  the  agent  finished  its  plan.  We  de-
note  this  weaker restriction  with  restore;  essentially,
it  ensures  that  the  agent  will  clean  up  after  itself
-by  hanging  up  phones,  closing  drawers,  returning
utensils  to  their  place,  etc.  An  agent  that  is  guar-
anteed  to  respect  all  restore  constraints  is  said  to
be  tidy.  For  instance,  to  guarantee  that  the  agent
will  re-compress all  files that  have been uncompressed
in  the  process  of  achieving  its  goals,  we  could  say
restore(compressed(f».
As with  dont-disturb  constraints,  we don't  require
that  the agent clean up after  other  agents -the  state
of the world,  when the agent is given a command, forms
a reference point.  However,  what  should  the  agent do
when  there  is a conflict  between  restore  constraints
and  top  level  goals?  For  example,  if  the  only  way  to
satisfy  a user  command  would  leave one file  uncom-
pressed, should  the agent refuse the user's command or
assume that  it  overrides  the  user's  background  desire
for  tidiness?  We propose  the  latter  -unlike  matters
of safety,  the  agent's  drive  for  tidiness  should  be sec-
ondary  to direct  orders.  The following  definition  makes
these intuitions  precise.
Definition:  Satisfaction  of  restore:  Building  on
the definition  of dont-disturb,  we say that Al  , ...,  An
satisfies  the  constraint  restore(  ()  with  respect  to
goal G if for  all  substitutions  0
if  Wo I= (0  then (  Wn I= (0  or  G I= -,(0)  (2)could  fix  this  problem  by  making  phase two  failures
spawn backtracking  over phase one decisions, but  this
could engender exhaustive  search over all possible ways
of satisfying  top  level goals.
Remarkably,  this  problem  does not  arise in the cases
we have  investigated.  For  instance,  a software  agent
has no  difficulty  grepping  through  old  mail  files  for
a particular  message and subsequently  re-compressing
the  appropriate  files.  There  are two  reasons why  tidi-
ness is often  easy to  achieve ( e.g., in software  domains
and kitchens):
.Most  actions  are  reversible.  The  compress  action
has  uncompress  as an  inverse.  Similarly,  a  short
sequence of  actions  will  clean  up  most  messes in
a  kitchen.  Many  environments  have  been  stabi-
lized  (Hammond,  Converse, &  Grass 1992) ( e.g., by
implementing  reversible  commands  or  adding  dish-
washers)  in  a  way  that  makes  them  easy to  keep
tidy.
.We  conjecture  that,  for a partial-order  planner,  most
cleanup  goals  are  trivially  serializable  (Barrett  &
Weld  1993) with  respect to  each other.9
When  these  properties  are  true  of  restore  con-
straints  in  a domain,  our  tidiness  algorithm  does sat-
isfy  constraint  2.  Trivial  serializability  ensures that
backtracking  over  phase one  decisions  (  or  previously
achieved cleanup  goals) is unnecessary. Tractability  is
another  issue.  Since demanding  that  plans  be tidy  is
tantamount  to  specifying  additional  (  cleanup)  goals,
requiring  tidiness  can clearly  slow a planner.  Further-
more  if  a  cleanup  goal  is  unachievable,  the  planner
might  not halt.  However, as long as the mess-inducing
actions  in  the  world  are easily  reversible,  it  is straight
forward  to  clean up for  each one.  Hence, trivial  serial-
izability  assures that  the  overhead  caused by  tidiness
is only  linear  in  the  number  of  cleanup  goals posted,
that  is linear  in the  length  of the  plan  for the top  level
goals.
possible  when  achieving  its  goals.  Unfortunately,  sat-
isfying  constraints  of  this  form  may  require  that  the
agent examine  every plan  to  achieve the  goal in  order
to  find  the  thriftiest  one.  We  plan  to  seek insights
into  this  problem  in  the  extensive  work  on  resource
management  in planning  (Dean,  Firby,  &  Miller  1988;
Fox &  Smith  1984; Wilkins  1988).
So far  the  discussion  has focused  on  preventing  an
agent from  actively  harming  a human,  but  as Asimov
noted  -inaction  can  be just  as dangerous.  We  say
that  an  agent  is  vigi/ant  when  it  prevents  a  human
from  harming  herself.  Primitive  forms  of vigilance  are
already  present in many  computer  systems, as the  "Do
you  rea//y want  to  delete  all  your  files?"  message at-
tests.
Alternatively,  one could  extend  dont-disturb  and
restore  primitives  with  an additional  argument  that
specifies the  class of agents being  restricted.  By  writ-
ing  self  as the  first  argument,  one  encodes the  no-
tions  of agent safety  and  tidiness,  and  by  writing  Sam
as the  argument,  the agent will  clean up  after,  and at-
tempt  to  prevent  safety  violations  by  Sam. Finally,  by
providing  everyone  as the  first  argument,  one  could
demand  that  the  agent  attempt  to  clean  up  after  a//
other  agents  and  attempt  to  prevent  all  safety  viola-
tions.  For more refined  behavior,  other  classes (besides
self  and  everyone)  could  be defined.
Our  suggestion  is  problematic  for  several  reasons.
(1)  Since the  agent has no representation  of  the  goals
that  other users are trying  to  accomplish,  it  might  try
to enforce a generalized  restore  constraint  with  tidy-
ing actions  that  directly  conflict  with  desired goals.  In
addition,  there is the question of when the agent should
consider the human  "finished"  -without  an adequate
method,  the  agent  could  tidy  up  while  the  human  is
still  actively  working.  (2)  More  generally,  the  human
interface  issues are complex -we  conjecture  that  users
would  find  vigilance  extremely  annoying.  (3)  Given  a
complex  world  where the agent does not have complete
information,  any any  attempt  to formalize  the  second
half  of Asimov's  First  Law  is fraught  with  difficulties.
The  agent might  reject  direct  requests to  perform  use-
ful  work  in favor  of spending  all of its  time  sensing to
see if some dangerous activity  might be happening  that
it  might  be able to  prevent.
Remaining  Challenges
Some changes cannot  be restored,  and some resources
are legitimately  consumed  in the  service of a goal.  To
make  an  omelet,  you  have to  break  some eggs.  The
question is,  "How  many?"  Since squandering  resources
clearly  constitutes  harm,  we could  tag  a valuable  re-
sources with  a min-consume  constraint  and  demand
that  the  agent be thrifty  --i.  e.  , that  it  use as little  as
Conclusion
This  paper  explores  the  fundamental  question  origi-
nally  posed by  Asimov:  how  do we stop  our  artifacts
from  causing us harm  in the process of obeying  our or-
ders?  This  question  becomes increasingly  pressing  as
we develop more  powerful,  complex,  and  autonomous
artifacts  such  as robots  and  softbots  (Etzioni,  Lesh,
&  Segal  1993;  Etzioni  1993).  Since  the  positronic
brain  envisioned  by  Asimov  is  not  yet  within  our
grasp,  we adopt  the  familiar  classical planning  frame-
work.  To  facilitate  progress,  we focused  on  two  well-
defined primitives  that  capture  aspects of the problem:
dont-disturb  and restore.  We showed that  the well-
understood,  and  computational  tractable,  mechanism
of threat  detection  can be extended  to  avoid  harm.
Other  researchers have considered related  questions.
A  precursor  of dont-disturb  is discussed in  the  work
9Formally,  serializability  (Korf  1987)  means  that  there
exists  a ordering  among  the  subgoals  which  allows  each to
be solved  in  turn  without  backtracking  over  past  progress.
Trivial  serializability  means that  every subgoal  ordering  al-
lows  monotonic  progress  (Barrett  &  Weld  1993).  While
goal ordering  is often  important  among  the  top  level  goals,
we observe  that  cleanup  goals  are  usually  trivially  serial-
izable  once  the  block  of  top  level  goals  has  been  solved.
For  example,  the  goal  of  printing  a file  and  the  constraint
of restoring  files  to  their  compressed  state  are serializable.
And  the  serialization  ordering  places the  printing  goal  first
and the  cleanup  goal  last.  As long  as the  planner  considers
the  goals in  this  order,  it  is  guaranteed  to  find  the  obvious
uncompress-print-compress  plan.Hammond,  K.,  Converse, T ., and Grass, J.  1992. The
stabilization  of environments.  Artificial  Intelligence.
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of  Wilensky  and  more  extensively  by  Luria  (Luria
1988) under the heading  of  "goal conflict."  Similarly,  a
precursor  of restore  is mentioned  briefly  in Hammond
et.  al's  analysis  of  "stabilization"  under  the  heading
of  "clean  up  plans"  (Hammond,  Converse,  &  Grass
1992).  Our  advances include  precise  and  unified  se-
mantics  for  the  notions,  a mechanism  for  incorporat-
ing dont-disturb  and restore  into  standard  planning
algorithms,  and an analysis of the computational  com-
plexity  of enforcing  safety  and tidiness.
Even so, our  work  raises more  questions  than  it  an-
swers. Are constraints  like dont-disturb  and restore
the  "right"  way  to  represent  harm  to  an agent?  How
does a~ent safety  relate  to  the  more  general  software
safety  (Leveson  1986)?  Can  we handle  tradeoffs  short
of using expensive decision theoretic  techniques?  What
guarantees  can one provide  on  resource  usage?  Most
importantly,  how  do we weaken the  assumptions  of a
static  world  and complete  information?
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